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GRAHAM V. FLORIDA:
JUSTICE KENNEDY’S VISION OF
CHILDHOOD AND THE ROLE OF
JUDGES
TAMAR R. BIRCKHEAD*

This short essay examines Graham v. Florida, the United States
Supreme Court decision holding that the Eighth Amendment’s
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause does not permit a juvenile
offender to be sentenced to life in prison without parole for a
nonhomicide crime. This essay argues that Justice Anthony
Kennedy’s majority opinion is grounded not only in Roper v.
Simmons, which invalidated the death penalty for juvenile offenders
on Eighth Amendment grounds, and Kennedy v. Louisiana, which
held that the Eighth Amendment prohibited the death penalty for
the offense of rape of a child, but also in Establishment Clause cases
set in the context of public schools and Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause cases upholding parental notification requirements
for teenagers seeking abortions. Whereas many journalists and
scholars consider Justice Kennedy a “legal pragmatist” who lacks an
overarching philosophy to guide his decisionmaking, in each of
these opinions his view of childhood and the proper role of judges is
consistent: children and adolescents are unformed works in
progress, in the midst of both character and brain development, who
are particularly susceptible to direct as well as indirect forms of
coercion. As a result, according to Justice Kennedy, when
determining what liberty interests are protected by the United States
Constitution, the role of judges and the courts is to ensure that youth
mitigates rather than aggravates. Further, although juvenile justice
advocates have heralded Graham as a clear victory, the opinion may
raise as many questions as it seeks to answer.

* Assistant Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill School of Law
(tbirckhe@email.unc.edu). I am particularly grateful for the comments of Sara Sun Beale,
Barbara Fedders, Eric Muller, and Gene Nichol during and subsequent to a discussion of
Graham v. Florida at the UNC Summer Workshop Series, as they helped crystallize my views of
the case. Of course, the arguments advanced therein and all errors and omissions are my own.
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On May 17, 2010, the United States Supreme Court decided the
1
case of Graham v. Florida, holding that the Eighth Amendment’s
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause does not permit offenders
convicted of nonhomicide crimes committed as minors to be
2
sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole (JLWOP).
Writing for the majority, Justice Anthony Kennedy applied a form of
Eighth Amendment comparative analysis that previously had been
reserved only for capital cases to conclude that evolving standards of
decency no longer support this type of sentence for this category of
3
offenders. Justice Kennedy contended that because “a sentencing
practice itself” (i.e., JLWOP) was in question, the appropriate analysis
was found in death penalty cases that exempted entire classes of
offenders who had committed a range of crimes, rather than term-ofyears cases that analyzed whether the gravity of a specific crime
4
justified the severity of an individual sentence. Without explicitly
acknowledging the Court’s apparent departure from its long-standing
5
“death is different” jurisprudence, Justice Kennedy followed the
approach of cases that prohibited the execution of the mentally
6
retarded, juveniles, and those convicted of child rape. In so doing, he

1. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010).
2. Id. at 2034. “JLWOP” refers to sentences of life without the possibility of parole for
offenses committed by “juveniles” or youth under the age of eighteen.
3. Id. at 2021–23.
4. Id. at 2022–23; cf. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003) (finding no Eighth
Amendment violation for a twenty-five-years-to-life sentence under a state recidivist statute for
a defendant who had stolen several golf clubs); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991)
(finding no Eighth Amendment violation for a life-without-parole sentence imposed upon a first
offender possessing a large quantity of cocaine).
5. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2022–23 (discussing the Court’s death penalty jurisprudence); see
also id. at 2038–39 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment) (“Treating juvenile life sentences
as analogous to capital punishment is at odds with our longstanding view that ‘the death penalty
is different from other punishments in kind rather than degree’.”); id. at 2045 n.1 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (“The Court radically departs from the framework those precedents establish by
applying to a noncapital sentence the categorical proportionality review its prior decisions have
reserved for death penalty cases alone . . . . Today’s decision eviscerates that distinction. ‘Death
is different’ no longer.”). Cf. William W. Berry III, More Different than Life, Less Different than
Death, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2010) (arguing that Graham did not abandon “death is
different” jurisprudence but was instead premised on the view that JLWOP is similar to the
death penalty and different than other forms of noncapital punishment); Robert Smith & G.
Ben Cohen, Commentary, Redemption Song: Graham v. Florida and the Evolving Eighth
Amendment Jurisprudence, 108 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 86, 90–91 (2010) (arguing
that the distinction between categorical challenges to a sentencing practice and challenges to an
individual sentence is “more semantic than substantive”).
6. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2022 (citing Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) and Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, opinion modified on
denial of reh’g, 129 S. Ct. 1 (2008)).
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found that a national consensus against JLWOP existed; that
penological theory, whether premised upon retribution, deterrence,
incapacitation, or rehabilitation, failed to provide adequate
8
justification for JLWOP; and that a new categorical rule was
necessary, given the insufficiency of the alternatives for addressing the
9
constitutional concerns raised by the imposition of JLWOP. Justice
Kennedy also relied upon what he characterized as a “global
consensus” against the practice, demonstrated by the sentencing laws
and practices of the international community vis-à-vis juvenile
10
nonhomicide offenders. Although some critics of the opinion
consider it yet another example of Justice Kennedy’s idiosyncratic
11
approach to decisionmaking, an examination of his nomination
testimony as well as his earlier opinions addressing the rights of
minors suggests otherwise.
I. JUSTICE KENNEDY’S JUDICIAL PHILOSOPHY
The underpinnings of the jurisprudential approach and philosophy
espoused in Graham are found in the testimony given by Justice
Kennedy during his United States Supreme Court nomination
12
hearings in 1987. When asked what standards a judge should follow
in determining whether government action has violated an
individual’s right to human dignity, Justice Kennedy explained that he
considers whether the action results in “the inability of the person to
manifest his or her own personality, the inability of a person to obtain
his or her own self-fulfillment, [or] the inability of a person to reach
13
his or her own potential.” Echoes of this sentiment are found in his

7. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026–27.
8. Id. at 2028–30 (finding that minors are not as morally culpable or susceptible to
deterrence as adults; that because incorrigibility cannot be accurately determined, juvenile
offenders should not be incapacitated for life; and that because many prison policies deny those
without the possibility of parole access to programs, counseling, and treatment, rehabilitation is
not a viable justification for JLWOP).
9. Id. at 2030.
10. Id. at 2033.
11. See, e.g., Chris Cassidy, Court Sides with Kids Sentenced to Life in Epic Battle over Our
Constitutional Rights, SLATE, May 19, 2010, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/chris-cassidy/courtsides-with-kids-sen_b_581880.html (describing Justice Kennedy’s approach to judicial decisionmaking as “fickle,” with the Graham opinion serving as the most recent example); see also infra
note 53 and accompanying text.
12. Nomination of Anthony M. Kennedy to be Assoc. Justice of the Supreme Court of the
U.S.: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 180 (1987) (statement of Judge
Anthony M. Kennedy).
13. Id.
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subsequent opinions explicating his substantive due process views,
15
his notion of the independent role of judges, and his belief in the
16
potential for young offenders to be redeemed.
One of the rationales for Graham’s holding, for example, was
premised on the negative impact of a juvenile defendant’s youth on
17
the attorney–client relationship. Justice Kennedy recognized that
because juveniles mistrust authority figures and have a limited
understanding of the criminal justice system, they are less likely than
adult defendants to work effectively with their lawyers, and as a result
18
are at a distinct disadvantage in criminal proceedings. He found that
a case-by-case analysis of whether to impose JLWOP failed to take
19
into account the “developmental incompetence” of youth or the
20
unique challenges faced by attorneys representing juveniles. He
contended that because many minors, like mentally incapacitated
21
defendants, cannot meaningfully assist counsel, the quality of their
14. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (“At the heart of
liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of
the mystery of human life.”); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003) (“Liberty presumes
an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate
conduct.”).
15. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 563–64 (2005) (“We then must determine, in
the exercise of our own independent judgment, whether the death penalty is a disproportionate
punishment for juveniles.”).
16. See, e.g., id. at 573–74 (“When a juvenile offender commits a heinous crime, the State
can exact forfeiture of some of the most basic liberties, but the State cannot extinguish his life
and his potential to attain a mature understanding of his own humanity.”).
17. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2032.
18. Id. See also Kristin Henning, Loyalty, Paternalism, and Rights: Client Counseling
Theory and the Role of Child’s Counsel in Delinquency Cases, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 245,
272–73 (2005) (stating that children generally do not work with attorneys as well as adults
because of their developing cognitive skills, emphasis on short-term consequences, and lack of
understanding of the attorney-client relationship).
19. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2032. See also Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso,
Developmental Incompetence, Due Process, and Juvenile Justice Policy, 83 N.C. L. REV. 793,
828–31 (2005) (discussing the unique features of developmental or adjudicative incompetence,
in which immaturity-based impairments can render a young offender unable to understand the
charges against him, the nature of the proceedings, or to assist his attorney in his defense).
20. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2032. See generally Tamar R. Birckhead, Culture Clash: The
Challenge of Lawyering Across Difference in Juvenile Court, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 959 (2010)
(discussing the cultural and systemic challenges faced by attorneys representing juveniles).
21. See Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 962 (2007) (granting habeas relief and
remanding case based on prisoner’s claim that he was denied meaningful opportunity to be
heard on question of competence to be executed); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 320 (2002)
(“Mentally retarded defendants may be less able to give meaningful assistance to their
counsel.”); see also Dan Markel, May Minors be Retributively Punished After Panetti (and
Graham)?, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. (forthcoming 2010) (arguing that minors, like the presently
incompetent, are not fit objects for the state’s blaming practices associated with retributive
punishment).
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representation is likely to be compromised on a categorical level.
Therefore, Justice Kennedy concluded, JLWOP as a sentencing
22
practice should be barred for nonhomicide offenses. In this way,
Graham reestablished Justice Kennedy’s commitment to ensuring
that the court system takes an appropriate account of a juvenile’s
23
youth, thereby giving young offenders some “hope of restoration.”
Justice Kennedy’s nomination testimony also addressed his
approach to constitutional interpretation, in which he rejected the
24
doctrine of original intent. He instead contended that although it is
“highly relevant what the framers thought . . . theirs is not the entire
body of contemporary opinion and contemporary expression that we
25
look to.” This view presaged his reliance in Graham on extrajudicial
sources. For instance, to support his view that young offenders are
incomplete works in progress for whom redemption remains a viable
possibility, Justice Kennedy cited social science research on
adolescent behavior as well as neuro-scientific data on brain
26
development. He also relied on the laws of other nations, the vast
majority of which bar JLWOP in all circumstances, in contrast to the
27
United States, the only country to impose it for nonhomicide crimes.
II. ROPER V. SIMMONS
In addition to Justice Kennedy’s nomination testimony, critical
motivating factors for the Graham decision are reflected in the
28
language and holding of Roper v. Simmons, in which Justice
Kennedy—again writing for the majority—held that the Eighth
Amendment prohibited capital punishment for offenders who were
29
minors when they committed their crimes. The parallels between the
two opinions’ rationales are striking. In Simmons, Justice Kennedy
was unwilling to tolerate the risk that jurors would objectify violent
juvenile offenders, judge them through the lens of stereotype and bias,

22. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2032.
23. Id. at 2027.
24. Nomination of Anthony M. Kennedy to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States: Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 180 at 150 (1987) (testimony of
Judge Anthony M. Kennedy).
25. Id.
26. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026.
27. Id. at 2033–34 (finding that only eleven countries allow JLWOP and that the U.S. is the
only country to impose the punishment for nonhomicides).
28. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
29. Id. at 575.
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and consider their youth as an aggravating rather than a mitigating
30
factor in sentencing. If, as he contended, psychiatric experts are
unable to distinguish between adolescents who act out of “transient
immaturity” and those who commit crimes reflecting “irreparable
corruption,” jurors cannot reliably be expected to make such
31
distinctions. Similarly, in Graham, Justice Kennedy was unwilling to
tolerate the risk that a judge or jury would sentence a minor to
JLWOP based on a “discretionary, subjective” judgment that the
32
youth was incorrigible and could not be redeemed. Although he
conceded that it was “salutary” that some state laws required
prosecutors to consider age when making charging decisions, he found
such safeguards inadequate to block a court from imposing JLWOP
33
on an offender who was not morally culpable. In both opinions
Justice Kennedy concluded that a case-by-case approach could not
reliably separate out those juveniles with the capacity for change; only
a categorical rule that drew a bright line between childhood and
adulthood was sufficient to avoid the imposition of punishment
34
disproportionate to the crime.
The facts underlying Simmons and Graham vividly illustrate these
principles. In Simmons, which involved the violent murder of a
woman by seventeen-year-old Christopher Simmons and a younger
boy, the prosecutor pointedly argued during the penalty phase of the
trial that the jury should consider Simmons’ youth as an aggravating
factor when determining whether a death sentence was appropriate:
“Think about age. Seventeen years old. Isn’t that scary? Doesn’t that
scare you? Mitigating? Quite the contrary I submit. Quite the
35
contrary.” In Graham the sentencing judge explicitly concluded that
seventeen-year-old Terrance Jamar Graham, who had prior armed
burglary charges and was alleged to have committed subsequent
robberies, was unalterably depraved: “[Y]ou decided that this is how
you were going to lead your life and that there is nothing that we can
do for you . . . . [W]e can’t help you any further. We can’t do anything

30. Id. at 572–73. See Tamar R. Birckhead, The Age of the Child: Interrogating Juveniles
After Roper v. Simmons, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 385, 390–91 (2008) (discussing the bases for
Justice Kennedy’s decision in Simmons).
31. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 573.
32. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2031.
33. Id. at 2030–31 (discussing the laws of Florida, the jurisdiction in which the juvenile,
Graham, was sentenced).
34. Id. at 2031–32; Simmons, 543 U.S. at 573–74.
35. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 558.
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36

to deter you.” In both opinions Justice Kennedy asserted that the
graphic brutality of the crimes and the seeming incorrigibility of the
offenders increased the risk that the fact-finder would be unable to
37
appreciate the significance of the defendant’s youth at sentencing.
A further similarity between Simmons and Graham is the
majority’s contention in each case that the holding was narrow and
circumscribed. Upon acknowledging in Simmons that the death
penalty might have some deterrent effect, Justice Kennedy
emphasized that JLWOP remained a viable punishment that was itself
38
“a severe sanction, in particular for a young person.” Five years later
he highlighted in Graham that although JLWOP was now barred for
nonhomicide offenses, the state was not “required” to release a
juvenile offender during his natural life and, thus, the possibility that
39
these defendants would remain imprisoned had not been foreclosed.
Justice Kennedy underscored that Graham forbade states only from
deciding “at the outset” that young offenders were intrinsically
40
incapable of redemption and would never be fit to reenter society.
However, the fact that Graham’s reasoning relied so heavily upon
41
Simmons belies such sentiments, giving credence to the view that
42
these holdings would inevitably be extended to other contexts.
III. KENNEDY V. LOUISIANA
In addition to Simmons, the reasoning in Graham also relied upon
the Eighth Amendment case of Kennedy v. Louisiana, which held that
capital punishment for the offense of rape of a child is cruel and

36. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2031.
37. Id. at 2031–32; Simmons, 543 U.S. at 572–73.
38. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 572. See also Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2039 (Roberts, J., concurring
in the judgment) (“Indeed, Roper explicitly relied on the possible imposition of life without
parole on some juvenile offenders.”).
39. Id. at 2030
40. Id.
41. See id. at 2022, 2026, 2028 (citing Simmons in support of the Court’s holdings).
42. See, e.g., Simmons, 543 U.S. at 621 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“If juries cannot make
appropriate determinations in cases involving murderers under eighteen, in what other kinds of
cases will the Court find jurors deficient? . . . Why not take other mitigating factors, such as
considerations of childhood abuse or poverty, away from juries as well?”); Graham, 130 S. Ct. at
2046 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“No reliable limiting principle remains to prevent the Court from
immunizing any class of offenders from the law’s third, fourth, fifth, or fiftieth most severe
penalties as well.”). See infra note 83 and accompanying text (discussing areas into which
Graham’s holding could potentially be extended, including challenges to JLWOP sentences for
homicide as well as homicide-related offenses such as felony-murder).
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43

unusual. Justice Kennedy revealed his vision of childhood in the
opinion’s implicit suggestion that severely victimized youth have the
potential for physical and psychological recovery and that because of
the unformed nature of their characters, even these children have the
44
capacity to change and, thus, to heal. This view is analogous to his
portrayal in Graham of young offenders as “not as well formed” and
45
therefore “more capable of change” than adults. Kennedy v.
Louisiana also set out Justice Kennedy’s view of the role of the courts
with his characterization of child rape as a brutal crime that “in many
cases will overwhelm a decent person’s judgment,” increasing the risk
that jurors could not consistently balance aggravating factors against
46
mitigating circumstances. This view was reiterated in Graham with
the assertion that judges must exercise “independent judgment” to
ensure that an adolescent offender’s youth is treated as mitigating and
47
not aggravating at sentencing.
Justice Kennedy’s arguably paternalistic inclination to deny the
decisionmaking capacity of youth in the name of protecting them is
also evinced in both of these cases. In Kennedy v. Louisiana Justice
Kennedy asserted that due to their inherent immaturity, child victims
should not undergo the trauma of testifying in a capital sex offense
case or be implicated by the state’s decision to seek the death
48
penalty. In Graham Justice Kennedy’s opinion was premised on the
view that because minors are not as culpable for their actions as
49
adults, they are “less deserving of the most severe punishments.” He
further contended in Kennedy that it was not clear that the child
victim’s “hurt” would be in any way “lessened when the law
permit[ted] the death of the perpetrator” rather than only life without
50
parole or a term-of-years sentence. He suggested that a state that
punishes child rape by death may in fact add to the risk of non- or
underreporting by children and remove a strong incentive for rapists
51
not to kill their victims. Similarly, Justice Kennedy asserted in
Graham that JLWOP sentences prevented young offenders from
43. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2646 (2008).
44. See id. at 2662–63 (discussing whether imposing the death penalty balances the wrong
to the victim in child rape and other nonhomicide cases).
45. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026.
46. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2660–61.
47. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2031–32.
48. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2660–61.
49. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026–27.
50. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2662.
51. Id. at 2663–64.
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accessing vocational training and rehabilitative services while
incarcerated, thereby categorically denying them the possibility of
redemption—a disproportionate punishment for juveniles who did
52
not commit homicide.
IV. FIRST AMENDMENT AND DUE PROCESS CASES
Despite critics’ claims that Justice Kennedy’s jurisprudential
53
approach lacks integrity, the Graham decision is also consistent with
his opinions addressing the rights of youth outside the context of
Eighth Amendment analysis. For instance, in writing for the majority
54
in the Establishment Clause case of Lee v. Weisman, Justice Kennedy
considered the matter from the perspective of the fourteen-year-old
when holding that the inclusion of invocation and benediction by a
member of the clergy at a public middle school graduation violated
55
the student’s rights under the First Amendment. Recognizing that
adolescents are often under pressure from peers to conform and that
implicit pressure to stand or maintain respectful silence may be subtle
but is “as real as any overt compulsion,” Justice Kennedy held that
prayer exercises in public schools carry “a particular risk of indirect
56
coercion.” In holding that school prayer may appear to the dissenter
or nonbeliever as an attempt “to employ the machinery of the State to
57
enforce a religious orthodoxy,” Justice Kennedy credited “the real
conflict of conscience faced by the young student” and asserted that
“[o]ur society would be less than true to its heritage if it lacked
58
abiding concern for the values of its young people.”
52. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2029–30.
53. See, e.g., FRANK J. COLUCCI, JUSTICE KENNEDY’S JURISPRUDENCE: THE FULL AND
NECESSARY MEANING OF LIBERTY 1–2 (2009) (referencing the “general consensus” that
Justice Kennedy lacks “a consistent approach to constitutional interpretation”); THOMAS R.
HENSLEY ET AL., THE CHANGING SUPREME COURT: CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND
LIBERTIES 75 (1997) (stating that Justice Kennedy “does not appear to have a consistent judicial
philosophy to guide his decision making”); TINSLEY E. YARBROUGH, THE REHNQUIST COURT
AND THE CONSTITUTION 17, 36 (2000) (describing Justice Kennedy as “a legal pragmatist” who
“refused to commit himself to a single, overarching theory of interpretation”); Robert Nagel,
Liberals and Balancing, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 319, 323 (1992) (stating that Justice Kennedy’s
nomination testimony suggested “to say the least, an undeveloped, mushy legal philosophy”).
54. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
55. Id. at 592–93.
56. Id. at 592–94.
57. Id. at 592.
58. Id. at 596, 598. Justice Kennedy’s adherence to this principle of government coercion
was latent in earlier Establishment Clause cases in which he found no evidence that the state had
taken steps to advance one religion over another. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Sch.
v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 260–61 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in

DO NOT DELETE

10/28/2010 3:07:46 PM

GRAHAM V. FLORIDA: JUSTICE KENNEDY’S VISION

2010]

75

Likewise, in the context of the Due Process Clause, Justice
Kennedy voted to uphold state statutes requiring parental notification
for teenagers seeking abortions. He acknowledged that although his
ideal of the compassionate and mature parent may not exist in every
instance, to assume otherwise would be to “deny all dignity to the
59
family.” In finding such laws constitutionally valid even without
judicial bypass provisions, Justice Kennedy focused on the apparent
needs of children in asserting that the exclusion of parents from the
decisionmaking process “is to risk, or perpetuate, estrangement or
alienation from the child when she is in the greatest need of parental
60
guidance and support.”
These opinions reflect and expand upon Justice Kennedy’s vision
of childhood and his view of the judicial role. Each reiterates his
belief that in cases concerning children and adolescents, courts must
show heightened sensitivity regardless of the context, and judges must
use their independent judgment to ensure that vital liberty interests—
both of the youth and the family unit—are protected. In Justice
Kennedy’s view, whether young people are pressured to conform to a
61
specific religious practice, left to decide whether to have an
62

63

abortion, or sentenced as adults for serious felonies, their youth
judgment) (finding that a federal statute did not violate the Establishment Clause by allowing
religious clubs to meet on school premises where there was no government coercion); Cnty. of
Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 664 (1989)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) (stating that the public
display of a menorah and a crèche was not an instance in which “the government’s power to
coerce has been used to further the interests of Christianity or Judaism in any way,” as they are
but passive symbols of religious holidays).
59. Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 520 (1990). See Hodgson v.
Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 482–85 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and
dissenting in part) (discussing “the State’s interest in acknowledging and promoting the role of
parents in the care and upbringing of their children”).
60. Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 486. But see, e.g., id. at 462–66 (Marshall, J., concurring in part,
concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (arguing that the parental notification
requirement “can have severe physical and psychological effects” on young women and that it is
“especially devastating for minors who live in fear of physical, psychological, or sexual abuse”);
Marcia D. Greenberger & Katherine Connor, Parental Notice and Consent for Abortion: Out of
Step with Family Law Principles and Policies, 23 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 31, 31, 35 (1991) (arguing
that parental consent and notice laws, such as those upheld in Hodgson, can “cause serious
harm” by “spark[ing] a family upheaval that otherwise would not occur,” and are “out of step
with the common state practice of allowing minors themselves to consent to medical services
relating to sensitive health concerns, particularly those services related to sexual activity”).
61. Weisman, 505 U.S. at 592–93.
62. Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 486.
63. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2029 (2010).
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must be acknowledged, accommodated, and ultimately protected.
V. CRITIQUES OF GRAHAM
Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Graham drew criticism from both
ends of the political spectrum. Some juvenile justice advocates and
scholars argued that by ordering states merely to provide an
“opportunity” for release, the opinion did not go far enough in
protecting young offenders from disproportionately punitive
64
sentences. They asserted that the Court failed to provide guidance or
objective standards to the states for evaluating a youth’s maturity or
65
amenability to treatment. As a result, given that the “means and
mechanisms for compliance” with the Court’s order are within each
individual state’s discretion, the victory—they contend—is but
66
Pyrrhic.
The arguments presented in Graham’s dissenting opinions provide
the opposing view, which reflects themes also expressed by the
Simmons dissenters. Justice Thomas in Graham and Justice Scalia in
Simmons both offered classic originalist critiques of Justice Kennedy’s
67
view of the role of judges and the courts. Premised on a traditional
reading of American history and an adherence to “centuries-old”
practice, Justices Thomas and Scalia argued (respectively) that the
Graham and Simmons majorities had flagrantly imposed their “own
sense of morality and retributive justice” on state lawmakers and
68
voters. In Graham Justice Thomas took issue with the substitution of
69
the Court’s judgment for that of “our fellow citizens.” He argued
against the necessity of a categorical rule, as the jury process
“necessarily admits of human error,” as does the “process of judging

64. See, e.g., Jeffrey Fagan, Juvenile Justice Delayed? Rather than Set a Uniform Standard to
Reduce Harsh Sentences for Minors, the Court in Graham Left Compliance Mechanisms up to
the States, NAT’L L.J. 38 (June 14, 2010) (“Rather than establishing a firm principle of
discounted culpability that would cabin harsh sentencing for all minors, Graham instead offers
eligible juveniles a ‘meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity
and rehabilitation.’ The ‘means and mechanisms for compliance’ are left up to the states.”
(quoting Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2016)).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See generally Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2043–58 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Simmons, 543
U.S. at 608–30 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
68. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2058 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Simmons, 543 U.S. at 615–16
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
69. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2043 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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in which we engage”; and he warned that the decision opened the
71
door for a whole host of line-drawing problems. In Simmons Justice
Scalia challenged the majority’s “implausible assertion” that a
national consensus existed against capital punishment for offenders
72
who committed murder before age eighteen. He argued that the
application of a categorical prohibition of the death penalty for all
minors was arbitrary and unwarranted, as capital cases already
73
required individualized consideration of each defendant. Justice
Scalia concluded by rejecting “out of hand” the notion that American
74
law “should conform to the laws of the rest of the world.”
Although several of these points are valid and have rhetorical
appeal, perhaps the most provocative dissenting argument expressed
in both Simmons and Graham challenged the majority’s reliance on
empirical data from sociological studies to establish that juveniles are
too impressionable and unformed to warrant either execution or
75
JLWOP. In Simmons Justice Scalia referenced studies that seemingly
contradicted the Court’s conclusions, including research relied upon
in an earlier case by Simmons amici to support the position that
adolescents have the cognitive ability to make an informed choice to
76
terminate a pregnancy. In response to Justice Scalia’s claims that the
amici had “flip-flopped” between the abortion case and Simmons,
prominent psychologists have asserted that although both cases
involved adolescent decisionmaking, the legal issues implicated were
very different, and the research in each case addressed “distinct
77
aspects of adolescent behavior and attributes.” In Graham Justice

70. Id. at 2055.
71. Id. at 2057.
72. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 608 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 620.
74. Id. at 624.
75. Id. at 617 (“[The majority] never explains why those particular studies are
methodologically sound; none was ever entered into evidence or tested in an adversarial
proceeding.”); Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2054–56 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that
“generalizations” from social science are irrelevant to constitutional rulemaking and challenging
the majority’s interpretation of the data).
76. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 617–18 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing studies relied upon in
Hodgson v. Minn., 497 U.S. 417 (1990), which upheld parental notification requirements for
teens seeking abortions). See also supra notes 59–60 and accompanying text (discussing Justice
Kennedy’s opinion in Hodgson).
77. See Laurence Steinberg et al., Are Adolescents Less Mature than Adults? Minors’
Access to Abortion, the Juvenile Death Penalty, and the Alleged APA “Flip-Flop,” 64 AM.
PSYCHOL. 583, 585 (2009). See also id. at 593 (urging those who seek “a uniform answer to
questions about where we should draw the line between adolescence and adulthood for
different purposes under the law . . . [to] consider the asynchronous nature of psychological
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Thomas similarly argued that the Court “misstate[d] the
[psychological] data” and improperly relied upon its own view of
78
“morality and social conditions.” Justice Kennedy’s failure to
respond to—or even acknowledge—these critiques is a legitimate
weakness of both opinions.
Neither dissent, however, recognized the ways in which its own
analysis offered merely an alternate value judgment to the one made
by the majority. A commitment to an interpretation of constitutional
and statutory text in which the words have fixed meaning—
unchanged since the days of the framers—may be just as subjective a
choice as Justice Kennedy’s focus on the institutional intent indicated
79
by the text. Perhaps the strongest objection to the use of originalist
jurisprudence by Justices Scalia and Thomas is the apparent
inconsistency with which they apply it, invoking it in cases such as
Simmons and Graham while “stretch[ing] or even ignor[ing it]
entirely if it interferes with strongly held policy preferences” (as in
federal affirmative action, school integration, and gender
80
discrimination cases). What remains consistent, however, are the
critiques of the dissenters when confronted with categorical bars to
specific types of sentences for juveniles; if Graham’s holding is
ultimately extended to other kinds of offenses or groups of offenders,
such arguments will likely be reiterated.
VI. CONCLUSION
One of the many questions left to address is the legacy of Graham:

maturation, especially during periods of dramatic and rapid change across multiple domains of
functioning”).
78. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2054–56 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
79. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 631–32 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing
that Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion, which held that the First Amendment forbids clergyled prayer at public school ceremonies, “invents a boundless, and boundlessly manipulable, test
of psychological coercion” that is “bereft of any reference to history” and “lays waste a tradition
as old as public school graduation ceremonies themselves, and that is a component of an even
more longstanding American tradition of nonsectarian prayer to God at public celebrations
generally.”). See also COLUCCI, supra note 53 at 2–7 (discussing Justice Kennedy’s rejection of
originalist jurisprudence in favor of a “moral vision of constitutional liberty”).
80. See, e.g., Scott Lemieux, Scalia and Thomas: Originalist Sinners, AM. PROSPECT, June
29, 2007, http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=scalia_and_thomas_originalist_sinners
(discussing the “sporadic commitment” of Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas to originalist
methods). See also Gene R. Nichol, Justice Scalia and the Printz Case: The Trials of an
Occasional Originalist, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 953, 968–73 (1999) (discussing the inconsistencies
with which Justice Scalia approaches constitutionalism and his frequent departures from
originalism).

DO NOT DELETE

2010]

10/28/2010 3:07:46 PM

GRAHAM V. FLORIDA: JUSTICE KENNEDY’S VISION

79

What is the opinion’s significance for Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence? Although the United States Supreme Court has never
before applied a categorical rule to the noncapital punishment
context, Graham could provide the basis for challenging JLWOP
sentences for homicides as well as for homicide-related offenses such
as felony–murder. Justice Kennedy’s view that an offender’s youth is
mitigating and not aggravating could be extended to argue that if the
youth did not kill or have the intent to kill, or is otherwise not deatheligible, no penological interest is served in allowing for JLWOP.
Likewise, Graham could ultimately support barring term-of-year
sentences that are the practical equivalent of JLWOP, such as ones
that only provide for parole review after thirty- or forty-years’
imprisonment. If JLWOP is in essence a sentence mandating that
81
young offenders die in prison, it may be indistinguishable from
decades-long incarcerative sentences that do not allow for even the
possibility of release until the offender is well into middle-age.
Moreover, now that juveniles have been categorically exempted from
JLWOP for nonhomicides, courts may be confronted with challenges
to life without parole sentences from adult defendants who are
psychologically incapacitated, mentally retarded, or even acutely drug
addicted. If their transgressions are found to be less morally
reprehensible than those who are not similarly impaired, the
argument that they too are unfit objects of the state’s sentencing laws
may require additional categorical exemptions from certain types of
punishment. Given that an estimated 2,500 juveniles are serving
JLWOP in the United States, of whom only 129 have been sentenced
82
for nonhomicide crimes, the long-term significance of Graham may
83
be found in its precedential effect rather than its direct impact.
Finally, what of Justice Kennedy’s arguably romantic notions and
paternalistic rhetoric vis-à-vis children? Will Graham be invoked to
limit adolescents’ decisionmaking capacity outside the realm of
criminal court? Can the Justice who most consistently holds the
81. Brief for Petitioner at 6, Sullivan v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2059 (2010) (No. 08-7621), 2009
WL 2159656 at *6; Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2033 (2010) (“Terrance Graham’s [life
without parole] sentence guarantees he will die in prison without any meaningful opportunity to
obtain release . . . .”).
82. Facts and Opinions on Juvenile Life without Parole, JUV. JUST. UPDATE (Civic
Research Inst., Kingston, N.J.) June–July 2010, at 9.
83. See Marsha Levick, Kids Really Are Different: Looking Past Graham v. Florida, 87
CRIM. L. REP. 1, 3–4 (July 14, 2010) (stating that Graham “opened the door” to extending its
ruling to juvenile felony murder cases as well as to juveniles serving lengthy terms-of-years for
nonhomicides).
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Supreme Court’s swing vote be persuaded to adopt a more nuanced,
textured vision of young people, one that exempts them from the
harshest forms of punishment while also recognizing and respecting
their autonomy in other contexts? Although speculating as to what
the Supreme Court will decide next is of less value than reading tea
leaves, suffice it to say that in future cases implicating the rights of
children, Justice Kennedy’s vision and philosophy will inevitably
remain a critical—if not dominant—factor.

